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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The sky is falling on legal education, say the pundits,1 and preparing “practice ready” 
graduates is one of the best strategies for surviving the fallout.2  This is not a new prediction or a 
new recommendation for survival.  It is a millennialist3 version of the argument for clinical legal 
education that dominated discussion in the law schools in the 1960s and 1970s.4  The                                                         
∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  My grateful appreciation to Andrew Blair-
Stanek, Maxwell Chibundu, Chris Condlin, Steve Ellmann, Don Gifford, James Grimmelmann, Michelle Harner, 
Alan Hornstein, Renee Hutchins, Susan Krinsky, Sue McCarty, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Frank Pasquale, Garrett 
Power, Bill Reynolds, Rohith Srinivas, Max Stearns, Charlie Sullivan, Greg Young, and participants in a University 
of Maryland Carey School of Law faculty workshop, all of whom made very helpful suggestions. 
1 These pundits congregate at the so-called “scamblogs” (i.e., law school is a scam), which have popped up online 
over the last few years.  For a representative collection, see David Lat et al., Scamblogs, ABOVE THE LAW, 
http://abovethelaw.com/tag/scamblogs/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  One might think of them as a law school version 
of “Doomsday Preppers” (perhaps Doomsday Preppies would be more accurate), preparing for the coming 
Armageddon in their own small part of the world.  Not everyone is a Chicken Little, of course, some see the present 
turmoil as leading to a better world.  See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, A Glass Half Full Look at the Changes in the 
American Legal Market, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 29, 29 (2014) (“The American legal profession finds itself in the 
midst of dizzying changes . . . [that] [t]he main commentators . . . have largely presented . . . as disastrous.  This 
[e]ssay argues that . . . [the changes] will prove beneficial overall.”); id. at 30-31 (describing the benefits to society, 
law students, and law schools of the coming changes). 
2 See, e.g., Symposium, The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice – Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in 
Experiential Legal Education, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 215, 221 (2012) (symposium on the effectiveness of 
clinical education for preparing lawyers to be “practice ready”); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462 (2013) (“Creating more ‘practice ready’ graduates will help some law schools more 
effectively place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—market for traditional entry level legal jobs.  
Yet, this strategy cannot work for all schools”); News Release, New York State Bar Ass’n, New York State Bar 
Resolution Calls for “Practice Ready Lawyers,” (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=6383 (“Law schools and other legal education providers 
should be encouraged to develop ‘practice ready lawyers . . . .’ ”).  Professor Henderson is skeptical that the 
“practice ready” strategy is enough to cope with the present troubles.  Henderson, supra, at 501 (“ ‘Practice-Ready’ 
is Not Enough. Despite the rebukes often received from the practicing bar, for most law schools an emphasis on 
“practice-ready” skills will be insufficient to cope with the structural changes occurring within the legal industry.”) 
(emphasis added). 
3 It is common today to identify millennialism with a date (e.g., the year 2000), a length of time (a thousand years), 
or a generation (those born in the 1980s), but in scholarly discourse the term refers to a system of thought based on 
the “belief that at some point in the future the world that we live in will be radically transformed into one of 
perfection—of peace, justice, fellowship and plenty.”  See RICHARD LANDES, HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE VARIETIES 
OF THE MILLENNIAL EXPERIENCE 20 (2011) (emphasis in original).  The key tropes in millennialist thinking, whether 
secular or religious, are “apocalyptic scenarios filled with . . . outrageous hopes and fears and paranoid conspiracy 
thinking.”  Id. at xii.  Blog commentary on the demise of legal education has all of these tropes. 
4 Debates about the law school curriculum go back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the iconic 
figures of Christopher Columbus Langdell, Josef Redlich, and Alfred Reed.  See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  
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circumstances are different now, of course, as are the people calling for reform.  For many, doing 
well has replaced doing good as the principal goal, and private, fee-for-service practitioners have 
replaced neighborhood legal services lawyers as the principal people leading the charge.  But the 
two movements are alike in one fundamental respect: both view skills instruction5 as legal 
education’s primary purpose.  Everything else is a frolic and detour, and a fatal frolic and detour 
in hard times such as the present.6 
 
Most would agree that the United States legal system has both a labor market and a student 
debt problem.7  The legal labor market was overbuilt and has retrenched.8  It also is shrinking in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 51-64, 112-23 (1983).  Practice instruction 
entered the picture in the 1930s, see, e.g., John S. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 
1 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (1934); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); 
George K. Gardner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School? – Some Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (1934); Karl N. 
Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935), and hit its high 
water mark in the “clinical education” movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when a coalition of former neighborhood 
legal services lawyers, segments of the Bar, and the Ford Foundation (through the Council on Legal Education for 
Professional Responsibility), urged law schools to become more “relevant” by making “skills training” rather than 
“thinking like a lawyer,” their central objective.  See Robert J. Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal 
Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 317, 332-36 (David Luban ed., 1985) 
(describing the origins of clinical legal education); John M. Lande, Reforming Legal Education to Prepare Law 
Students Optimally for Real-World Practice, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (describing “a history of more than a century 
of criticism and recommendations for reform” of legal education).  Clinical education had non-skill dimensions as 
well, see infra note 99, but they gradually diminished in importance as clinical programs tried to appeal to a broader 
market.  That private practitioner lawyers would wage a similar campaign fifty years later would have astonished 
those early clinicians.  I know, I was one of them. 
5 Once synonyms, “skills instruction” and “clinical education” now have slightly different meanings.  Skills courses 
teach about lawyer interpersonal practice tasks (e.g., interviewing, counseling, and negotiation), usually using 
hypothetical, self-contained, and substantively disembodied exercises, problems, and drills.  Clinical courses also 
teach about interpersonal practice tasks, but in the context of actual client representation where, of necessity, they 
also teach about substantive law, professional values, interpersonal relationships, institutional and organizational 
arrangements, and the like.  Substantive law and practice skill are interrelated, of course, since skill operates 
famously in the “shadow of the law.”  Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
6 Arguments of this sort proliferate during difficult economic times and diminish during prosperous ones.  Karl 
Llewellyn’s Depression era change in views about the importance of practice instruction is a good example.  See 
Anders Walker, Bramble Bush Revisited: Karl Llewellyn, the Great Depression, and the First Law School Crisis, 
1929-1939, J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2014), draft at 20-26, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325022 (during the Depression “Llewellyn blasted legal 
education for failing ‘to equip’ students ‘for the practice of law,’ ” suggesting that it needed to provide “sounder 
technical training,” only to revert to his original interdisciplinary, academic perspective when prosperity returned). 
7 See AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION: WORKING PAPER 1 (Aug. 1, 2013) (The 
“complex system of tuition, discounting, and loans” used to fund legal education “drive[s] up both tuition and debt . 
. . [and is] in need of serious re-engineering.”). 
8 Bernard A. Burk, What’s New about the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 541 (2014) (“[T]he market for new lawyers overall, will remain depressed below pre-
recession levels well after demand recovers . . . .”); Chris Johnson, The Am Law 200’s Haves and Have-Nots, AM. 
LAW. (June 10, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202600856100 (describing how $2.4 billion was wiped 
from the Am Law 200’s collective top lines in 2009—the first fall in overall revenue since the American Lawyer 
started tracking law firm financials more than two decades ago). 
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the face of increased competition from non-law-firm service providers,9 changes in technology,10 
and downward pressure on fees from clients.11  As a consequence, there are fewer jobs for law 
graduates to fill, and fewer law graduates with jobs means fewer graduates able to repay their 
student loans.12  These conditions are beginning to have an effect on the size and cost of legal 
education and probably will continue to do so into the foreseeable future.13  But it does not 
follow that they should have a corresponding effect on the structure and content of that education 
as well. 
 
Law schools cannot revive the labor market, or improve the employment prospects of their 
graduates, by providing a different type of education.  Placing students in jobs is principally a 
function of a school’s academic reputation, not its curriculum,14 and the legal labor market will                                                         
9 See Barton, supra note 1, at 32-34 (describing the role of “disruptive technologies” in increasing the pressure from 
“above, below and the side” on the market for legal services, using LegalZoom as an example), and at 35 (changing 
market conditions will have the same effect on small firm lawyers that “Turbotax has had on the accounting 
profession.”) (emphasis added).  But see Robin Sparkman, Don’t Bury Big Law Just Yet, AMLAW DAILY (July 24, 
2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202612266779&Dont_Bury_Big_Law_Just_Yet 
(“The [hundred] biggest law firms, ranked by their gross revenue, continued to post revenue and profit gains even as 
the U.S. economy sputtered.”). 
10 See James G. Leipold, The New Entry-Level Legal Employment Market, BAR EXAMINER, June 2013, at 7, 
available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Bar-Examiner/articles/2013/820213Leipold.pdf (describing 
“the impact of technology” on the legal industry). 
11 Press Release, Association of Corporate Counsel, More Corporate Law Departments Turn to Legal Support 
Services to Reduce Excessive Fees (June 19, 2013), http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/acc-
value-champions-2013.cfm (“General counsel are restructuring the balance of projects they outsource versus those 
they maintain in-house, pursuing long-term partnerships with choice law firms and looking at new ways to share 
costs in multi-party litigation . . . .”).  See also Leipold, supra note 10, at 11 (“[C]hange is the result of . . . 
downward pressure on rates by corporate clients.”). 
12 At the present time law student default rates on student loans are lower than the default rates of students in all 
other forms of postsecondary education and have been for twenty years.  See Michael Simkovic, Repetitive (and 
avoidable) mistakes, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 28, 2013, 8:53 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/repetitive-and-avoidable-mistakes.html (describing student loan 
default rates).  That may change.  See also Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ 
Remorse? An Empirical Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211 (2013) 
(reporting on the first two waves of data from the American Bar Foundation After the J.D. project, describing the 
effect of law school debt on job choice and career satisfaction). 
13 See Barton, supra note 1, at 35 (describing the consequences for law schools of the recent crash in legal markets); 
Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are Cutting Faculty, WALL ST. J., July 15, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323664204578607810292433272.html (describing how law 
schools with a dwindling applicant pools are accepting fewer students and making up for lost tuition dollars by 
“offering buyouts and early-retirement packages to senior, tenured professors and canceling contracts with lower-
level instructors.”); Dan Filler, University of Iowa Approves Steep Law Tuition Cut, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Dec. 5, 
2013), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/12/university-of-iowa-approves-steep-law-tuition-cut.html (describing 
how some law schools are reducing tuition “to bring the 1L class size back up.”). 
14 Firms will assume, as they should, that the most highly regarded schools will have the ablest students and that the 
ablest students will be the quickest studies.  There will be individual exceptions to these rules of thumb, of course, 
and better training can narrow the differences between schools to some extent, but smart money bets on talent and 
probabilities, not training, anomalies, or vignettes.  Not everyone agrees.  See Neil J. Dilloff, Law School Training: 
Bridging the Gap between Legal Education and the Practice of Law, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 427-28 (2013) 
(“[T]hose law schools that are able to turn out ‘finished’ work-ready graduates will move to the head of the pack, 
and their graduates will have a leg-up in this uncertain job market.”); Neil Hamilton, Law-Firm Competency Models 
and Student Professional Success: Building on a Foundation of Professional Formation/Professionalism 3 (Univ. of  
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rebound only after the market as a whole has rebounded (and perhaps not then).  Law school 
curricular reform is not an economic stimulant and trying to use it for that purpose will destroy 
something that works in a futile attempt to revive something that does not.  Legal education’s 
principal purposes should be (and always have been) to develop an intellectual understanding of 
law and legal institutions and the way they work, as well as the critical thinking skills that 
underlie law practice tasks generally.  Becoming proficient at practice tasks is the work of work, 
so to speak, the result of performing the tasks over and over again, on a daily basis, under the 
guidance of mentors, as part of the process of being socialized into the profession.  Legal 
education, like most higher education, helps one avoid becoming a captive of socialization more 
than it socializes,15 and to adapt received wisdom to changing beliefs and circumstances more 
than internalize wisdom in its present form. 
 
The labor market and student debt problems have been discussed extensively at both the 
breezy and sophisticated levels and I will not revisit those discussions here.16  Instead, I will 
focus on the popular “practice ready” graduates proposal and explain why it is a bad idea.17  The 
proposal has been accepted uncritically in many quarters and this is surprising, since it is largely                                                                                                                                                                                   
St. Thomas School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-22, Dec. 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2271410 (“A law student who understands legal employer competency models can 
differentiate him or herself from other graduates by . . . [developing] specific competencies beyond just knowledge 
of doctrinal law, legal analysis, and some written and oral communication skills.”).  Comparative advantage 
arguments of this sort have the self-cancelling quality characteristic of many well-known bargaining nostrums (e.g., 
“never make the first offer”).  See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 310 
n.83 (2011-2012).  If everyone followed them they would not work.  For example, if preparing practice-ready 
graduates gives a law school a comparative advantage in the employment market eventually every law school will 
adopt the strategy, and that will destroy its advantage.  The strategy works, in other words, only if a few schools use 
it; but every school will use it if it works.  See Henderson, supra note 2, at 242 (“Creating more ‘practice ready’ 
graduates will help some law schools more effectively place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—
market for traditional entry level legal jobs.  Yet, this strategy cannot work for all schools”).  There also is 
considerable empirical evidence that the strategy does not work.  See infra note 30. 
15 It helps one avoid becoming another President Robbins.  See RANDALL JARRELL, PICTURES FROM AN INSTITUTION 
11 (2010) (“President Robbins was so well adjusted to his environment that sometimes you could not tell which was 
the environment and which was President Robbins.”).  Not everyone thinks this is a bad thing.  See Dilloff, supra 
note 14, at 438 (describing the importance of being a “can do” instead of “can’t do” lawyer in responding to client 
requests), and at 441 (describing the importance of being “virtually integrated into the client’s business”).  Professor 
Hamilton describes becoming one with the client as a “client-identified competency” that law schools and students 
should develop to differentiate themselves from other schools and other students.  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 
19.  The “practice-ready” graduates proposal has some of the same properties as this client-identification view, in 
the sense that it asks law schools to treat law firms as clients and identify completely with firm needs. 
16 For a sophisticated discussion of whether law school is a good investment, see the Simkovic-Tamanaha debate 
described in infra note 26.  For a discussion of the student debt problem, see Philip G. Schrag, FAILING LAW 
SCHOOLS—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013), and Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
The Problems with Income Based Repayment, and the Charge of Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2013).  
17 Professors Konefsky and Sullivan reach a similar conclusion but for a slightly different reason.  See Alfred S. 
Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, Commentary: There’s More to the Law Than ‘Practice-Ready,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Oct. 23, 2011, at A30 (“Law graduates must be practice-ready, not simply in the sense of being ready for the first 
stage of practice, but by being equipped for a lifetime of professional growth and service under conditions of 
challenge and uncertainty . . . .  [They must] pay attention to the work of anthropologists . . . psychologists, and 
sociologists . . . because their insights are useful—even indispensable—in understanding and solving legal problems 
in our complex and rapidly changing world.”). 
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unintelligible in its own right, and even if intelligible, irrelevant to the present troubles.  There 
are as many different types of practice, for example, as there are levels of readiness for it, and 
proponents of the proposal do not explain which of these various possibilities (and combinations 
of possibilities), they have in mind.  If the “practice ready” concept had a single meaning, on the 
other hand, schools still could not act on it since proficiency18 at practice (or any expert skill) is 
based on dispositions (i.e., habits informed by reflection), and dispositions take longer than a 
school semester to develop.  If by some sleight of hand, or divine intervention, these obstacles 
could be overcome, still nothing would change, since the cause of the present troubles is a lack 
of jobs, not a lack of graduates, and producing more graduates (of any kind) will have no effect 
on the supply of jobs.19  Like a lot of blog commentary, the “practice ready” proposal is more 
slogan than idea.  Perhaps that is why it is so popular. 
 
II.   THE ARGUMENT FOR PRACTICE READY GRADUATES 
 
 Prevailing wisdom has it that legal education has drifted into uncharted waters, its 
instruments have failed, and it is in danger of sinking.  All of this happened quickly, as a 
consequence of upheavals in the economy at large, and came as a surprise to most in the field.  
First came the recession and the concomitant flight of wealth from the economy, then a decrease 
in economic activity that wealth had fueled, then a corresponding loss of law firm business that 
economic activity had supported, followed by law firm reductions in staff to compensate for the 
loss of that business, and ultimately by fewer jobs for newly minted law school graduates in the 
now downsized law firms.20  All the while, law schools proceeded as if it were business as usual, 
admitting the same number of students, charging the same prices, and turning out the same 
number of graduates.  It did not take long for supply to outstrip demand and for student debt to 
outstrip ability to pay.21                                                         
18 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 430 (describing the obligation of “the nation’s law schools to enhance the level of 
legal maturity and proficiency of their graduates.”). 
19 There would be no agitation for “practice ready” graduates if high-paying legal jobs were still plentiful, just as 
there was no such agitation before the 2008 recession.  The animating force behind the “practice ready” proposal is a 
depressed labor market, not inadequate legal education.  Legal education is the focus of the present discussion 
largely because it is an easy target and, as Professor Leiter explains, unemployed law graduates need to find 
“someone to blame in order to anaesthetize their pain.”  Brian Leiter, American Law Schools and the Psychology of 
Cyber-Hysteria, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-leiter/law-
schools-cyber-hysteria_b_4517107.html.  As for bloggers, their agitation seems traceable to a disappointment with 
their place in the great chain of being.  They seem to have expected greater things.  Some also still may be mad 
about their grades. 
20 Some see this as a good thing.  See Barton, supra note 1, at 30-31 (“America as a whole will be significantly 
better off if we spend less on legal services . . . A reallocation of human resources away from law will also be 
beneficial to society as a whole, the legal profession, and [law] students themselves.  Society benefits because too 
many bright young people have been going to law school, rather than potentially choosing societally more beneficial 
work.”). 
21 Many people have told this story, from different perspectives and with different emphases.  A representative 
sample includes: STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Barton, supra note 1; Stephen F. Diamond, The Future of the American Law School 
or, How the ‘Crits’ Led Brian Tamanaha Astray and His Failing Law School Fails (Santa Clara U. Legal Studies 
Res. Paper No. 3-13, Jan. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207749; Henderson, supra note 3; Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds, Small Is the New Biglaw: Some Thoughts on Technology, Economics, and the Practice of Law, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.  Professors Simkovic  
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At first, this all seemed like a minor hiccup in an economic system characterized by 
boom and bust cycles.  But over time it became clear that a market correction of historic 
proportions and unknown duration was underway,22 and many bloggers started to describe the 
changed conditions as the “new normal.”23  Lending institutions continued to insist that student 
educational loans be paid on time, however, and soon some law graduates without jobs could not 
do this.24  Many of these graduates had thought of law school as more like a Treasury Bill than a 
junk bond, and had not considered what they would do if the investment did not work out.25  
When remunerative work did not follow automatically from schooling, therefore, they began to 
scream.26                                                                                                                                                                                   
and McIntyre’s analysis of the economic value of a law degree added a level of empirical and technical 
sophistication to the discussion that had been missing in some of the earlier analyses.  See Michael Simkovic & 
Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree (HLS Program on the Legal Profession Res. Paper No. 2013-
6, Apr. 13, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585.  For a summary of 
reactions to the Simkovic & McIntrye article and the authors’ responses, see Michael Simkovic, The Economic 
Value of a Law Degree: Week 1 Summary, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 21, 2013, 10:06 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/the-economic-value-of-law-degree-week-1-summary.html; 
Michael Simkovic, The Economic Value of a Law Degree: Correcting Misconceptions, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. 
REPORTS (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:35 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/the-economic-value-of-a-law-
degree-correcting-misconceptions.html. 
22 Hildebrandt Consulting LLC & Citi Private Bank, 2013 CLIENT ADVISORY 1 (2013), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CitiHildebrandt2013ClientAdvisory.pdf (“[W]e think it is time to 
let go of any lingering notion that the [legal] industry will revert to the boom years before the Great Recession 
anytime soon.”). 
23 This term became popular after Mohamed A. El-Erian, the CEO of Pacific Investment Management Company 
(PIMCO), used it in the 2010 Per Jacobsson lecture.  See Mohamed A. El-Erian, Navigating the New Normal in 
Industrial Countries, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 10, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/101010.htm.  The concept itself is an old one, however, and not 
given much credence by economists.  See Catherine Rampell, The ‘New Normal’ Is Actually Pretty Old, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/the-new-normal-is-
actually-pretty-old/; Alice Gomstyn, Finance: Americans Adapt to the ‘New Normal,’ ABC NEWS (June 15, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/storynew?id=7827032&page=1#.UeQE42T71P8.  Legal bloggers seem 
to find the expression irresistible.  The most well-known proponents are Patrick Lamb and Paul Lippe, who named 
their blog on the ABA Journal Online after the expression.  See Welcome to ‘The New Normal,’ THE NEW NORMAL 
(Oct. 13, 2010, 10:31 CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/welcome_to_the_new_normal. 
24 Even some graduates with jobs could not make the loan payments.  See Leipold, supra note 10, at 13-15 
(describing the declining salaries paid new law graduates in firms of all sizes, and those paid to graduates forced to 
take jobs outside the legal market).  But see Simkovic, supra note 12 (describing how law school graduate loan 
default rates are lower than the default rates for graduates of higher education generally), and Dinovitzer, Garth & 
Sterling, supra note 12 (describing the effect of law school debt on job choice and career satisfaction). 
25 See Barton, supra note 1, at 31 (“[M]any of the law students from five years ago did not belong in law schools.  
They came because it was a default choice for smart college graduates who were bad at math but still wanted a safe 
career with a large salary.”). 
26 See Barton, supra note 1, at 35 (“Disgruntled law graduates started the ball rolling with so-called ‘scam-blogs’ 
decrying law school as nothing more than a bait and switch hustle.”).  The screamers may not represent a significant 
percentage of law school graduates generally.  The blogosphere has become a bit of an echo chamber on topics of 
this sort.  Even academic commentators have been known to raise their voices.  Criticism of the Simkovic/McIntyre 
paper on the value of a law degree is a good example, though that debate now appears to be over.  See, e.g., 
Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 21.  See also Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha Says We Should Look at the 
Below Average Outcomes (And We Did), CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 18, 2013, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/07/brian-tamanaha-says-we-should-look-at-the-below-average-
outcomes-and-we-did.html#sthash.EGH1GZyw.dpuf (debate between Michael Simkovic and Brian Tamanaha over 
the economic value of a law degree); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 1): Why We Used  
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Legal bloggers were quick to capitalize on the situation.27  Young lawyers read blogs out 
of proportion to the profession at large, and stories about student educational debt guaranteed 
large and enthusiastic audiences.  Early discussions described the problem—the cost of law 
school, the size of the collective debt, the unavailability of traditional mechanisms for dealing 
with it (e.g., bankruptcy)—more than they analyzed it.  When this became old hat, emphasis 
shifted to assigning blame, and almost instantly attention focused on law schools.  Schools were 
faulted for charging too much, misleading applicants about employment prospects, not preparing 
students for a changing market, and being profligate spenders (overpaying and under-working a 
lazy professoriate) and passing the cost on to the group least able to bear it (i.e., students). 
 
This focus on law schools was a little surprising.  Law schools had not caused the 
recession and were not major players in the economy.  This non-sequitur notwithstanding, in 
short order reform of legal education became the principal blogging game in town, and the 
demand for “practice ready” graduates became the proposal around which most bloggers 
united.28  Graduates who are able to function competently as lawyers from day one in the office, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
SIPP Data from 1996 to 2011, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 24, 2013, 5:17 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-1-why-we-used-sipp-data-from-
1996-to-2011.html (same); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 2): Who’s Cherry Picking?, 
BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 25, 2013, 9:23 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-2-more-years-of-data-are-just-as-
likely-to-increase-the-earnings-prem.html (same); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 3): We 
Use Better (and more) Data than Studies Tamanaha Praised in his Book, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 
26, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-3-we-use-
better-and-more-data-than-studies-tamanaha-praised-in-his-bo.html (same); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s 
Straw Men (Part 4): We Would Have to be off by 85 Percent for Our Basic Conclusion to be Incorrect, BRIAN 
LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 29, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-
tamanahas-straw-men-part-4-we-would-have-to-be-off-by-85-percent-for-our-basic-conclusion-to-b.html (same); 
Michael Simkovic, Sample Size, Standard Errors, and Confidence Intervals, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS 
(Aug. 5, 2013, 6:29 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/sample-size-standard-errors-and-
confidence-intervals.html (Simkovic responding to Deborah Merritt’s criticisms of the “Economic Value” paper).  
See also infra note 104.  Not everything in the debate was shouting, there also were some funny parts.  See, e.g., 
Professor Diamond’s declaration of a winner, after first showing that everyone was on the same side.  See Stephen 
F. Diamond, Man Bites Dog: “Bad Cop” Law Prof Paul Campos, Leader of Anti-Law School Camp, Backs New JD 
Value Study, TAXPROF BLOG (July 19, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/07/what-is-the.html 
(business law professor explaining the concepts of net present value and opportunity cost to “law and literature” 
trained law professor); Stephen F. Diamond, Brian Tamanaha to the Law School World: “Never Mind,” TAXPROF 
BLOG (July 29, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/07/diamond-responds.html [hereinafter 
Diamond, Never Mind] (describing Brian Tamanaha’s “surrender” in the debate).  See also Brian Leiter, Reflections 
on “The Economic Value of a Law Degree,” and the Response to It, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 30, 
2013, 4:54 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/the-economic-value-of-a-law-degree-redux-1-
1.html (summing it all up). 
27 The blog Above the Law is the most notorious of these.  It runs a version of a law school debt story almost every 
day.  For a representative sample, see Search Results for Student Debt, ABOVE THE LAW, 
http://abovethelaw.com/?s=student+debt (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
28 Even the American Bar Association weighed in on the issue.  See ABA House of Delegates Recommendation 10B, 
2011 Annual Meeting, AM. BAR ASS’N (adopted as revised 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2011_hod_annual_mee
ting_daily_journal_FINAL.authcheckdam.pdf (“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges legal  
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so the argument went, would have a better chance of finding work than graduates who need 
extensive training to become cost effective and trustworthy.29  If law schools want their students 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
education providers to implement curricular programs intended to develop practice ready lawyers including, but not 
limited to enhanced capstone and clinical courses that include client meetings and court appearances.”). 
See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION: DRAFT 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2-3 (Sept. 20, 2013) (on file with the author) (“The balance between doctrinal 
instruction and focused preparation for the delivery of legal services needs to shift still further toward developing the 
competencies required by people who will deliver legal services to clients.”).  This latest ABA paper on legal 
education is a deeply flawed document.  Starting from what it describes as a “fundamental tension” between legal 
education’s dual status as a “public [and] private good,” id. at 6-7 (what the Report actually describes is the tension 
between education and training—it mistakenly thinks of those as the same thing), it proposes reconstituting law 
schools as technical training institutes “devoted specifically to preparing students to pursue and compete for jobs.”  
Id. at 13.  It makes a few, mostly adjectival, concessions to critics of its earlier working paper on the same subject, 
see supra note 7, but for the most part it retains the anti-intellectualism and worker bee myopia that characterized 
that earlier work.  It shows no awareness of the obligation to prepare lawyers to implement rules and operate 
institutions to serve the ends of justice, fairness, equality, and efficiency, for example, or the obligation to future 
generations to help construct legal norms and institutions that can adapt to changing social and political 
circumstances, needs, and beliefs.  Instead, it focuses obsessively on the present and constructs a blueprint for 
satisfying students’ immediate “customer” desires rather than theirs and the legal system’s long-term interests. 
In this same spirit, it depicts legal scholarship as a drag on education, adding to its cost without producing 
any corresponding benefit, ignoring the numerous contributions of legal scholarship to the development of law over 
the years. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
(privacy); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978) (tax); 
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 
(2013) (commodities trading); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993) (antitrust); Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964) (property); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (environmental protection); Robert C. 
Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. 
REV. 707 (1983) (copyright); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/5/6528.php (consumer financial protection); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (product safety); and dozens of others.  See THE CANON OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William Fisher III eds., 2006) (describing twenty law review 
articles that have had a profound effect on the shape of American law and legal institutions); Michelle M. Harner & 
Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholarship Out of Touch? An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business 
Law Cases, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing the influence of legal business law scholarship on the 
decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court).  It also ignores the systemic contributions of scholars like Henry Hart 
and Albert Sachs, Mitchell Polinsky, Richard Posner, and numerous others, who changed the ways in which 
generations of judges and lawyers go about their business and think about law and legal institutions.  Scholarship is 
the legal system’s seed corn, and destroying seed corn eventually makes an ecosystem uninhabitable. 
The Task Force’s mindset reminds me of my brief experience as a member of the Long Range Planning 
Committee of a major state bar.  Long range planning for our Committee consisted of someone saying: “You know, 
last week this happened to me; there ought to be a law against it,” and the Committee (with me excepting) agreeing.  
See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 
1600 (2014) (“Smart people operating as part of a group may be perfectly willing to make decisions on the basis of 
their pooled reflections.  Particularly if they can claim expertise or are confident about their power, they may also be 
willing to recommend bold action that they deem normatively desirable without worrying about empirical support 
and without any rigorous attempt to assess costs and benefits.”).  Hopefully, the ABA House of Delegates will 
understand the risks in such casual empiricism and spare law schools the harm wreaked by similar short term 
thinking in the present day worlds of law practice and business.  “The customer is always right” may have worked 
for Marshall Field in selling dry goods, but it is a prescription for disaster in legal education. 
29 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 427-32.  
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to get jobs therefore, they must make them “practice ready” when they graduate.30  Perhaps this 
is correct, but there are many reasons to doubt it.   
 
To begin with, it is not clear what types of “practice” proponents of the concept of 
“practice ready” have in mind.  Biglaw practice differs from small and medium size firm work, 
for example, government work from private practice generally, in-house corporate work from 
each of these, and all of them from prosecuting and defending criminal defendants, or 
representing clients in a neighborhood legal services office for the poor.  Each setting involves 
working with different kinds of clients on different types of problems, provides access to 
different levels of resources and supervisory guidance, and requires different types of knowledge 
and skills.  In some of these settings lawyers work principally with ideas and texts (writing 
memos, proof reading documents, reviewing transcripts), in others principally with people 
(interviewing clients, deposing witnesses, negotiating with lawyers, arguing to judges), and in 
still others principally with institutions (filing documents and searching records in courts, 
agencies, departments, registries, and the like).  People have known for a long time that law is 
not a “unitary profession.”31                                                         
30 The available evidence suggests that this strategy does not work.  Over two decades ago the MACCRATE REPORT 
found that law firms preferred their own in-house skills training programs to those of law schools, and that they did 
not view participation in law school skills courses as an important factor in hiring.  See REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON 
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, ABA LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 7 n.2 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE].  This makes sense.  Firms 
with the resources to train new lawyers (i.e., mostly Biglaw firms), can design (or contract for) programs tailored 
closely to their types of practice and firm culture, and these programs will be more efficient than the less 
sophisticated, generic ones offered by law schools.  Firms also have better access than law schools to expert 
practitioners to teach such programs.  Accord Dilloff, supra note 14, at 451-53.  If anecdotal evidence is correct, 
Biglaw associates laid off during the recent recession are having a more difficult time finding work than less 
“practice ready” new law graduates, and this also suggests that law firms like to do their own training.  Law school 
skills courses are valuable primarily to students who will work in firms where in-house training is not available.  See 
MACCRATE, supra, at 30 (“[I]f the recruits for [law firms with their own training programs] are getting needed or 
highly useful training, [one must ask:] what of the much larger number of new attorneys who begin practice by 
themselves or in offices that do not provide such training?”).  Deborah Merritt’s recent discussion of the 
employment effects of Washington & Lee Law School’s “practice ready” curriculum, see Karen Sloan, Reality’s 
knocking, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 7, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202433612463&Realitys_knocking&slreturn=20130719130100 
(subscription required) (describing the Washington & Lee curriculum), confirms these conclusions.  See Deborah J. 
Merritt, An Employment Puzzle, LAW SCHOOL CAFE (table started on June 18, 2013), 
www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/an-employment-puzzle/ (“Washington & Lee pioneered an experiential third-year 
program that has won accolades from many observers . . . . Surely graduates of this widely praised program are 
reaping success in the job market?  Sadly, the statistics say otherwise.  Washington & Lee’s recent employment 
outcomes are worse than those of similarly ranked schools.”). 
31 See Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REV. 573, 580 (1994) 
(“[A]n effort to define lawyering as a ‘single public profession of shared learning, skills and professional values’ 
which is focused on the past . . . is shortsighted and potentially unproductive.”); Lande, supra note 4, at 1 
(“[L]awyers work on many types of problems . . . .”); Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report—Heuristic 
or Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 505, 511 (1994) (“[T]he legal profession is in fact stratified and specialized in 
its functions, and not all lawyers are cut from the same mold.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing 
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 534-49 (1994) 
(describing differences between practice “cultures”, with special focus on commercial litigation and family law 
practice); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 
1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 166 (1994) (describing differences in lawyer practice roles). For descriptive accounts of  
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Law schools cannot prepare students for all of these types of work because the range of 
skills needed is too large.  But they also cannot target sub-categories of the work because 
students will not know what types of practice they will enter when they graduate.  They may 
know what they would like to do, but they cannot be sure there will be jobs in those fields, or if 
there are jobs, that they will be competitive in the markets to fill them.  They also cannot be sure 
that their preferences in law school will remain intact once they have worked in a field.  Some 
expectations may turn out to be unwarranted and some assumptions false.  Should this happen, 
the time spent learning skills no longer used might appear, in retrospect, to have been a greater 
waste of time than the time now spent learning law they think they will not use.32 
 
 If the concept of “practice” could be given a single meaning, however, there still would 
be the question of what it means to be “ready” for that practice.33  Must newly minted lawyers be                                                                                                                                                                                   
different types of practice, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN (1993), and DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE 
(1993).  Law school graduates who do not work in law firms will need even different types of skills. 
The differences between types of legal work are not limited to practice skills.  Conventions for truth telling, 
candor, and fair play also vary considerably from one type and location of practice to another.  See, e.g., MILTON R. 
WESSEL, THE RULE OF REASON: A NEW APPROACH TO CORPORATE LITIGATION 1-31 (1976); Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1981) 
(describing differences in professional conventions in different types of practice); Donald D. Landon, Clients, 
Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 81 (describing differences between small town and big city practice); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, 
Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973) (describing special tactics 
available to legal services lawyers).  Only the skill of “thinking like a lawyer” cuts across all categories of legal 
work and is performed in the same way everywhere and all of the time.  For descriptions of the “thinking like a 
lawyer” skill, see Barry B. Boyer & Roger C. Crampton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and 
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 270 (1974); Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers 
Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
32 Professor Hamilton argues that certain fundamental competencies, values, and virtues fit all legal work settings 
and all types of law firms.  He describes these qualities in such general terms, however, and in so many different 
ways, that it is hard to know specifically what he has in mind.  Overall, he seems to be saying that law firms and 
clients prefer to hire responsible individuals with well-developed social skills and adult work habits.  See Hamilton, 
supra note 14, at 25-33.  This is as helpful as it is controversial. 
33 Neil Dilloff, a senior partner in the world’s second largest private law firm, provides a list of “top ten” 
competencies needed to be practice ready.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 438-43.  Reviewing all ten would be 
unwieldy, so I will limit myself to the first two.  The “[f]irst, and perhaps foremost” lawyer competency, says 
Dilloff, is the ability to make judgments.  Id. at 438.  Exercising good judgment, he explains, is “about knowing 
what is right or wrong . . . know[ing] the right way to do things.”  Id.  No doubt this is true, though he does not 
explain how to tell the difference between right and wrong, particularly in hard cases, and that is where most people 
need help.  As a second point, he recommends that law schools teach problem-solving skills.  This is important, he 
says, because “[t]he only way to be able to ‘think out of the box’ is to practice living outside one (or at least 
expanding the size of the box).”  Id. at 438-39.  If one lives outside the box, however, one already thinks outside of 
it, by definition; how to live outside the box is where advice is needed.  Similarly, expanding the size of box would 
seem to make it more difficult to get outside of it, yet Dilloff does not explain how the two instructions are to be 
coordinated.  The rest of his “top ten” discussion is written at the same level of detail.   
Professor Hamilton also emphasizes the importance of teaching judgment, but he is similarly circumspect 
about how it is done.  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 20.  Like Dilloff, he is strong on general exhortation and short 
on operating instructions.  His exhaustive survey of the literature on lawyer competencies would be a meta-analysis 
of the studies in the field but for the fact that it contains almost no analysis, even when the study findings he 
describes are confusing or contradictory (e.g., studies finding that law schools are highly rated at teaching “legal 
analysis and legal reasoning” but not highly rated at teaching “substantive law,” without discussing how it is  
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able to perform on their own, for example, without the guidance and supervision of experienced 
mentors?  If so, must they function at the level of the “reasonably competent practitioner,” or is it 
enough that they remain above the level of the lowest common denominator?  Must they be 
proficient at their work, or is it enough that they appear proficient?34  Are they “practice ready,” 
for example, if they can draft a coherent and logically organized memorandum or pleading 
irrespective of its quality,35 or ask a series of understandable and logically ordered questions in 
an interview or deposition, irrespective of the questions’ helpfulness to the case?  Must they be 
able to teach themselves a new body of law over the weekend, adapt standard forms to fit a 
client’s estate plan, do “country conditions” research, trace a chain of title in a registry of deeds, 
file a document with an agency, interview a witness, or perform any of the dozens of other such 
tasks assigned to entry-level lawyers (and paralegals) in even mid-size and small law firms?36  
Someone who cannot do all of these things is not “ready” to practice law in one sense of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
possible to do legal analysis without knowing substantive law).  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 21.  No one would 
argue with recommendations written at this level of generality, the problem is in knowing what they mean.  For 
better efforts, see Janet Weinstein et al., Teaching Teamwork to Law Students, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 36, 46-64 (2013) 
(describing law school instruction in teamwork skills); Clark D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want From Their 
Lawyers?, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 143 (describing methods for soliciting client views about lawyer competencies).  
Admittedly, it is difficult to describe “soft” practice skills, and equally difficult to describe how they could be 
taught, but unfortunately those are the burdens that come with making the “practice ready” argument.  For the most 
sophisticated effort in this regard, see Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Identification, Development, and 
Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering (Sept. 2008), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/LSACREPORTfinal-12.pdf (identifying a set of twenty-six distinctive lawyer 
“effectiveness factors”). 
34 The “practice ready” argument seems to demand proficiency at practice skills, not just awareness of them.  See 
supra note 18. 
35 Chris Sevier’s Complaint in his fraudulent representation, products liability, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress diversity action against Apple is a case in point.  The Complaint alleges in clear, logically 
organized, coherent, and sometimes even eloquent prose, that Apple’s failure to sell its products in “safe mode,” 
with its control panels set to block pornography websites, “caused him to see pornographic images that appealed to 
his biological sensibilities as a male and lead [sic] him to . . . develop an arousal addiction . . . [which caused him] to 
prefer . . . cyber beauties over his wife . . . his marriage to fail” and his wife to “abducted his son.” [sic]  Complaint 
at 21, Sevier v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 3063595 (M.D. Tenn. June 19, 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-00607).  Mr. Sevier, a 
lawyer (and songwriter), may express his ideas skillfully but he is not “practice ready” to draft a Complaint. 
36 One of the most common complaints of lawyers is that law students cannot write.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 
434 (“My observation is that many first year students need to work on their writing—some, a lot.”)  Lawyers are not 
the only ones to make this complaint.  Teachers at every level of education (elementary school, junior high school, 
high school, college, graduate and professional school) say the same thing about the students they inherit from the 
previous level.  While the complaint has some validity in each instance, it has more to do with substantive 
socialization than technical writing skill.  Each time students move to a new educational or occupational level, with 
its own distinctive vocabularies, theoretical frameworks, intellectual standards, practice conventions, and the like, 
they must learn a new form of life.  The skills and knowledge that enabled them to be successful at the previous 
level can help them get started at this process, but to become full-fledged members of the new environment they 
must assimilate native-speaker ways of thinking, speaking, and behaving, and this takes time.  Given this, pointing 
out that new law graduates cannot write is a little like pointing out that babies do not know how to use flatware, or 
that puppies do not know to urinate outside.  These are true points no doubt, but the conditions are not permanent, or 
anyone’s fault, and they will change if insiders are patient and explain how things are done.  Professor Williams 
pointed this out many years ago, and his is still the single best discussion of the topic.  See Joseph M. Williams, On 
the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 13-16 
(1991).  
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term, but expecting new law graduates to be able to do all of them is wishful thinking.  The list 
of required skills is simply too long.37   
 
Proponents of “practice-ready” education do not seem to understand the difference 
between socialization and education.  Socialization is the work-based process of internalizing the 
habits, values, beliefs, vocabularies, and motor skills of a profession to make them second 
nature.38  A fully socialized individual is able to use legal knowledge and practice skill to signal 
to others that he is an insider and should be treated as such.  Becoming socialized in a profession 
is a long-term process, however, a consequence of repeated immersion in the profession’s tasks, 
relationships, and body of knowledge.  The process has a natural life cycle that cannot be 
accelerated or reproduced (except minimally) by facsimile experiences in schools.  Legal 
education contributes to professional socialization—being a law student is itself a type of 
professional role—but it provides too limited an experience of actual law practice to move one 
very far along in that process.  It can apprise students of the skills needed to succeed in practice, 
describe the components of those skills, provide standards for evaluating their performance, and 
show how the skills can be adapted to changing circumstances, needs and beliefs, but it cannot 
make students skillful.  That takes longer than an academic semester. 
 
Schooling and work divide responsibility for the education of law students along a kind 
of understanding/performance line: the former provides the background information, theory, and 
critical thinking skills needed to understand the legal system intellectually, and the latter 
provides the opportunity to turn that intellectual understanding into behavioral dispositions by 
putting the understanding into practice.  The two processes interlock and overlap, of course, each 
doing the work of the other on occasion, but at their core they are fundamentally different, and 
cannibalizing one to bolster the other will bring the entire system down.  They work in tandem, 
not in isolation, and each is essential to the development of a professional practitioner.39 
 
Law school clinical instruction brings these two processes together by having students 
represent clients in actual cases and review their efforts with supervisors against explicit 
standards of competent performance.  The distinctive feature of this type of instruction is its                                                         
37 See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 5-8 (describing a list of “Common Values, Virtues, Capacities and Skills” that 
runs on for several pages).  
38 The socialization process also inculcates what Michael Polyani first famously described as “tacit knowledge,” the 
unwritten practices and conventions that give meaning to knowledge in an area of practice or study and that cannot 
be transmitted explicitly in propositional form but learned only through the active immersion in shared activities 
with members of social groups that possess the tacit knowledge.  See MICHAEL POLYANI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4-5 
(1966).  See also MICHAEL POLYANI & AMARTYA SEN, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (2009) (a reissuance of Polyani’s 
book with a Foreword by Amartya Sen); HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007) 
(applying the concept of tacit knowledge to the development of expertise generally); Nicky Priaulx & Martin 
Weinel, Behavior on a Beer Mat: Law, Interdisciplinarity & Expertise, J.L. TECH. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405160 (applying the concept of tacit knowledge 
to the development of legal expertise). 
39 This understanding/performance distinction is similar to the one described by Nicholas Lemann between 
“research,” the pursuit of knowledge and understanding without the constraints of immediate practical applicability, 
and “mass higher education,” the low cost training in consensus practical skills.  See Nicholas Lemann, The Soul of 
the Research University, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/The-Soul-of-the-
Research/146155?cid=megamenu. 
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ability to confront its subject both methodologically and substantively: to analyze skills while 
actually using them.  Students work on problems in the first person, in lawyer role, in the full 
richness of real-life factual situations, with the ready-made pressures that responsibility for the 
interests of others produces.  They make choices and judgments to a degree absent in other types 
of instruction and live with the consequences.  This makes the issue of responsibility a 
meaningful concern.40  The driving force in this process is the dynamic of role adjustment and 
the need it generates to understand and justify one’s actions.41  Performing unfamiliar tasks 
under expert observation, with real interests at stake, requires a cognitive framework that reduces 
the anxiety unfamiliarity generates and gives consistency and coherence to one’s behavior.  
Since this process is tied intimately to a sense of self, the motivational energy generated is very 
high.42  
 
Underlying this process are two foundational premises, one psychological and the other 
philosophical.  The psychological premise grows out of the work of Erik Erikson and has to do 
with the way that adults develop identity.43  Personality is not well set by the time a student 
enters law school.44  Our society prolongs the development of identity45 by extending formal                                                         
40 Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in 
CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 384-85, 391 (Council on Legal Education for Professional 
Responsibility ed., 1973).  See also Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 581, 585-86 (1976); 
Issues of . . . responsibility . . . loom large on the clinical agenda . . . . Should 
they [the students] drown adversary litigators in a sea of paperwork, lie to 
adversaries for bargaining advantage, or decide, as a legal aid lawyer, to 
represent one type of client rather than another when resources are too scarce to 
represent both?  Clinical courses are superior vehicles for sensitizing students to 
these issues, because the student must actually make a choice among competing 
options.  Unlike the student in a classroom, he cannot stop after pointing out the 
risks and costs inherent in each available course of action, but must actually 
select one of them, execute it, and incur the associated costs.  His decision may 
well be irreversible, and he will have to live with its consequences for weeks or 
months thereafter. 
Id. 
Dean Gerard Nash of the Monash University in Melbourne put the point succinctly: “Responsibility cannot 
be simulated . . . .”  William Pincus, Text of Remarks at the Annual Luncheon of the Association of American Law 
Schools – January 4, 1980, in WILLIAM PINCUS, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW STUDENTS 425 (1980) (quoting 
Gerard Nash). 
41 As Professor Bellow once put it: “experience produces a qualitative change in the mode and content of knowing, 
which cannot be replicated by the transmission of information or the discussion of cases . . . in a classroom.  The 
ways in which legal concepts and ideas are understood after they have been used . . . ‘feel[s]’ differently in a sense 
that is not fully explained by the fact that they are more readily remembered.”  Bellow, supra note 40, at 382. 
42 Id. at 383-85.  These epistemological and motivational consequences alter the professor-student relationship in 
profound ways.  In classroom instruction students often are unable to judge the effectiveness of professor 
behavior, in part because of the absence of any shared frame of reference within which to form and express their 
views.  Practice instruction provides this frame of reference, in the form of a shared law-practice world in which 
students gain confidence, knowledge, and critical perspective through the performance with their professors of 
lawyer practice tasks.  This, in turn, increases their understanding and scrutiny of professor actions and 
pronouncements and frees them to judge those actions and pronouncements critically. 
43 ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1994); ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (1994). 
44 Not everyone agrees with this.  See, e.g., James J. White, The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course, in CLINICAL 
EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 158, 171 (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1970) (“Only a fool would  
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education well beyond adolescence.46  This in turn delays role commitments, including 
occupational commitments, attendant upon adult status and creates a space in which educational 
instruction can have a significant developmental impact.  Because law students do not usually 
think explicitly about their roles as lawyers, the construction of their professional identities 
results largely from the emulation of role models—those who are respected, or in some cases 
feared or hated, for their performance of practice tasks.47  Clinical practice instruction provides 
students with models of technically competent lawyer behavior and the opportunity to try out 
that behavior under expert guidance to make it part of their personality.  In theory, little could be 
done to improve upon such a design.48 
 
The philosophical premise underlying practice instruction traces its roots to Aristotle49 
and has to do with the way that virtue is known.  It holds that only someone who has had the 
experience of acting in a certain way is capable of understanding that way of acting.  
Understanding is arrived at by reflecting on activities that have been experienced pre-reflectively 
and internalized as habits.  Critical reflection on habits, to harmonize behavior with belief, is an 
important but chronologically second step in the process.  The neophyte need not (and in fact 
cannot) be aware at first of why the acts he imitates are virtuous or skillful; it is enough that he 
knows that people regarded as virtuous and skillful behave in that way.  Only after reflecting on 
behaving in this way does the virtuous and skillful nature of the behavior become clear, and at 
that point the behavior becomes a disposition.  Until disposition is present, however, the 
character of action cannot be fully understood.50 
 
Given this epistemology, it is not hard to see how law school clinical practice instruction 
was thought to provide an ideal setting for the development of lawyer practice skills and values.  
In practice courses students are able to imitate the behavior of skillful and virtuous lawyers 
responding to real problems and reflect on their (the students’) efforts under the guidance of 
experts using explicit conceptions of competent practice.  By experiencing and reflecting on 
what it is to act skillfully and ethically, students are thought to be able to develop an 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
suggest that . . . [a] law teacher could recast a twenty year old liar or do much else about the fundamental values 
which his environment has instilled in him.”).  See also Brainerd Currie, Reflections on the Course in the Legal 
Profession, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48 (1969); James E. Starrs, Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont via the Pervasive 
System, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (1965).  Some law professors claim that they can shape the professional behavior 
but not personal behavior of students.  The nature of this distinction is not self-evident.  See MICHAEL J. KELLY, 
LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 38 (1980). 
45 Identity is “the sense of self, formed from emotionally significant relationships with others which shape one’s being 
and one’s image of self . . . .”  Andrew S. Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective 
on Legal Education, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 248, 250 (1975). 
46 Alan Stone calls this a “crucial variation” in our culture and “an entirely new phenomenon in the history of 
civilization.” Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 399 (1971). 
47 Watson, supra note 45, at 250; see also Bellow, supra note 40, at 381. 
48 Things do not always go as well in practice as theory suggests they should.  See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra 
note 4, at 324-32 (criticizing the models of effective practice demonstrated in some parts of clinical education). 
49 See, e.g., SIR DAVID ROSS, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 28-39 (1975).  See also M.F. Burnyeat, 
Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 69 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
50 The skill learned in this process is that of practical judgment, the capacity to decide what to do when different 
sorts of objectives and values, not all of them commensurable, bear upon the same situation. 
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understanding of competent professional practice and act in accordance with it.  Again, in theory, 
little could be done to improve upon such a design. 
 
The problem, of course, is that the time frame of a law school semester does not permit 
this process to play out to any significant extent.  Acting in lawyer role for thirteen weeks (or 
even an academic year), does not provide an opportunity to observe, imitate, reflect on, and 
internalize the skills and values of professional practice to any substantial extent.  Students will 
be novices at the end of this process as much as at the beginning, advanced novices perhaps, but 
novices nonetheless.  They will have seen only a small number of lawyer skills and values in 
operation and have had almost no chance to try them out with the frequency needed to make 
them dispositions.  Given the limited opportunity to practice provided by practice instruction, 
therefore, it is unrealistic to expect law students to be “practice ready” by the time they graduate 
from law school.  They may have stood for the first time, but they will not yet be out of the 
crib.51 
 If actual practice instruction cannot make students practice ready, instruction based on 
simulated practice experience is even less likely to do so.  Simulated experiences are easier to 
construct and administer than actual practice experiences, and thus can be used to provide more 
extensive opportunities to try out lawyer skill tasks, but simulated experiences are useful mostly 
for teaching the motor skill dimension of lawyer tasks.  They lack the real life emotional, 
psychological, and informational content needed to permit students to make the judgments 
involved in deciding how to proceed in the first instance.  Take client or witness questioning as a 
example.  It is a relatively simple thing to teach someone to ask questions in a clear and 
understandable form.  One needs only to have the person rehearse the questions over and over 
again—eliminating dependent clauses, big windups, preemptive apologies and explanations,                                                         
51 This is not an argument against practice-based instruction in general.  Practice skill cannot be learned 
independently of activity.  Without the requisite experience even an intellectually gifted person is incapable of 
behaving skillfully.  Since practice courses help one begin to develop skills, such courses are an important part of a 
law school curriculum.  My point is simply that they should not be the dominant part of that curriculum, or play a 
larger role than they do in most law schools at the present time.  See Lande, supra note 4, at 5 (“[L]aw schools have 
revised their curricula in the last decade to increase practical education.  Under A.B.A. Standard 302(a)(4), students 
were required to receive ‘substantial instruction’ in ‘professional skills’ . . . [and] the A.B.A . . . found that most law 
schools [meet] this requirement . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  ).  See also Sheldon Krantz & Michael A. Millemann, 
Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510609 (describing “significant recent changes in legal 
education that have added practice-based courses, or practice-based components to courses, in all three years of 
legal education.”). The ABA has changed its views on the adequacy of practice instruction programs over the years 
and now believes that law schools are not doing as much as they should in that regard.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra 
note 7, at 2 (“[L]aw schools have done much to expand . . . opportunities [for skills training and experiential 
learning, but] [t]here is [the] need to do more.”).  Consequently, it recently changed the law school accreditation 
standards to require six hours of experiential learning credit as a condition of graduation.  See ABA SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REVISED STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 
Std.303(a)(3) (effective Aug. 12, 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_r
eports_and_resolutions/201406_revised_standards_clean_copy.authcheckdam.pdf.  The experiential learning 
requirement will be phased in gradually. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
TRANSITION TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS ¶ 4 (Aug. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governan
cedocuments/2014_august_transition_and_implementation_of_new_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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rising inflection, qualifiers and modifiers, unintended pauses, inappropriate pace, interruptions, 
filibusters, and the like—until the questions are direct, clear, and succinct.  This aspect of 
question asking is learned in the same manner as athletic technique – by repetition and critique.  
But simulated question asking is to actual question asking what batting practice is to hitting in an 
actual baseball game.  The physical part is the same, but the judgments involved in determining 
how to proceed are not.  Real life questioning must take the other person’s emotional and 
intellectual states into account, as well as the circumstances that affect the person’s willingness 
and ability to respond fully and accurately to one’s questions.  Simulated question asking does 
not provide the contextual richness needed to do this.52 
 
In the end, however, these concerns are largely beside the point.  The argument for 
“practice ready” graduates is not driven by a desire to prepare law students for practice as much 
as one to shift the cost of new lawyer training from law firms to law schools.  Increasingly, 
clients with leverage (Biglaw clients in particular) are unwilling to permit new law firm 
associates to work on their projects;53 they will not pay for on-the-job training.54  In the old days, 
law firms saw new lawyer training as their responsibility, and some still do,55 but now that they 
are ranked publicly according to several measures of profitability56 most firms are looking for                                                         
52 Neil Dilloff suggests that field trips to clients’ offices and visits from “outside business people, government 
officials, and others to discuss and simulate client conferences, strategy meetings, and problem solving,” will 
“resonate” with students and leave lasting impressions.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 437-38, 439, and 448.  Perhaps 
this is true for people who believe in “Road to Damascus” moments, but most people learn skills by actively 
practicing them, not by listening to war stories, or watching dog and pony shows.  There is no voyeur form of 
experiential learning. 
53 David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html (citing 
American Lawyer survey that found that “47 percent of law firms had a client say, in effect, ‘We don’t want to see 
the names of first- or second-year associates on our bills.’ ”). 
54 See Leipold, supra note 10, at 8 (“[C]orporate clients continue to be unwilling to absorb th[e] costs [of training 
new lawyers.]”); Dilloff, supra note 14, at 446 (“[clients] don’t want to pay for a new way to ‘learn on the job.’  
They want law schools to have already trained the new lawyer.”)  Dilloff doubles down on the claim, adding that 
“graduates and employers” also want law schools to do the training, id. (“[T]he desires of all three constituencies . . . 
[is that] new lawyer [skills] should be taught in law school . . . .”), but this is a little self-serving.  Clients do not 
want to pay for training, that much is clear, but it does not follow that they care one way or another about whether 
law schools or law firms pay for it.  They have no stake in that argument.  Graduates also could not care less about 
who pays as long as they are trained.  Dilloff is right that “employers” (i.e., law firms), do not want to pay for 
training, but his curiously circumspect way of making that point reminds one of Priscilla Mullins’ question to John 
Alden.  See Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Courtship of Miles Standish, in HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, 
POEMS AND OTHER WRITINGS 280, 294 (2000) (“Why don’t you speak for yourself, John?”). 
55 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 431-32 (describing a law firm “grace period” in “the old days” in which “the new 
lawyer’s primary job was to learn, . . . [but] [t]oday, things are much different.”) 
56 See The 2014 Am Law 200, AM. LAW., May 29, 2014, 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202494427064&The_2014_Am_Law_200 (rankings of 
law firms according to “Gross Revenue, Profits Per Partner, Revenue Per Lawyer”).  See also Dilloff, supra note 14, 
at 432 (“[T]oday’s economics of law do not permit extensive non-billable training.”); id. n.28 (“Escalating salaries 
and associate turnover require that entry-level attorneys generate substantial billable hours from the day they walk in 
the office and begin consuming expensive overhead.”) (quoting Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyers 
Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 303-04 (2002).  Gilding the 
lily, Dilloff blames even the Howrey collapse, at least in part, on the failure to transfer new lawyer training costs.  
Dilloff, supra note 14, at 432 n. 26 (describing how Howrey tried to maintain a new lawyer training program and  
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ways to cut costs, and one popular strategy is to pass the expense of training new lawyers on to 
the next person in line; and law school is that next person.  The push for practice ready graduates 
should be seen for what it is therefore, a move by law firms to save money,57 not a program for 
improving the education of law students.58 
 
Unfortunately for law firms, the strategy cannot work.  Law schools cannot teach 
students how to find mentors, coordinate paralegal assignments with other lawyers, share 
secretaries with partners, secure the best work assignments, or do any of the dozens of other such 
practical tasks that are needed in firms “on day one of their first full time job.”59  These are 
situation-specific skills that require local knowledge, on-site experience, and insider help, and 
law schools cannot reproduce the circumstances and conditions in which they are learned.60  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
“[the firm] is now defunct . . . .  [The program] turned out to be a luxury that the firm could not afford.”).  New 
lawyer training costs were the least of Howrey’s problems. 
57 There is a contradiction, of course, in both wanting law schools to pay for training and not trusting law schools to 
train.  See supra note 30 (describing how law firms do not give skills instruction great weight in the hiring decision).  
It is not uncommon for “espoused theory” and “theory in use” (as Chris Argyris and Donald Schön used to put it) to 
contradict one another in the lives of individuals, so I suppose it should not be surprising to find the same 
contradiction in the lives of law firms as well.  Alan Frost, Organizational Learning Theory from a Company-Wide 
Perspective, KMT, http://www.knowledge-management-tools.net/organizational-learning-theory.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2014).  
58 The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education concedes as much.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 
16 (“[I]n the second half of the twentieth century . . . [t]he legal profession increasingly began to assign, or try to 
assign, more responsibility to law schools for the practical and business aspects of the education of lawyers, mainly 
for economic reasons (including unwillingness [sic] of clients to subsidize the education of new lawyers.”)).  Mark 
Price, the labor economist, put the point succinctly.  He said: “it is at least comforting to know that law firms are not 
that different from firms in Manufacturing or Health Care[;] that is[,] they would prefer that somebody else pay for 
the skills that make them profitable.”  Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice: Be an Unpaid Intern 
Through Your 20s (Then Work till You’re 100), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/11/new-york-times-financial-advice-be-an-unpaid-intern-
through-your-20s-then-work-till-youre-100.html (quoting Mark Price).  See also Diamond, supra note 21, at 4-5 
(“Under tremendous economic pressure today, on a global scale, capital is looking for ways to cut costs, particularly 
legal costs.”).  It is a sad statement about the contemporary legal world that many in the profession, professors and 
lawyers alike, seem to think that law schools exist solely to satisfy the needs of law firms.  Legal education has 
obligations to law, legal institutions, and individual students that are equal to, and different from, its obligations to 
firms. 
59 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 429; 
A person is “ready to practice” if she knows “how to deal with her secretary 
(who also services three other lawyers, including a senior partner) and her 
paralegal (who also works for five other lawyers, including two partners), has 
her eye out for a potential mentor, has the ‘people skills’ to seek out the right 
lawyers for whom to work, has an ability to ferret out the type of assignments 
she likes and clients for whom she wishes to work, and has developed a can-do 
pleasant attitude[.]  [Without these skills] all the ‘book learning’ in law school 
will be of secondary importance.” 
Id. at 430-31. 
60 The same is true for the suggestion that law schools should teach students “business sense.”  Business sense is 
developed by representing business clients, and law school practice courses do not provide much of an opportunity 
to do this (there are a few limited exceptions).  If they tried, the organized Bar would object, since most businesses 
can pay for representation.  Law schools can offer courses and programs in conjunction with business schools, of 
course, and many do, but I take it the “business sense” recommended by Dilloff and Hamilton refers to business  
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They cannot recreate the complex personal histories, institutional arrangements, power 
structures, and practical incentives and constraints that characterize even the simplest law firm 
practice setting, and to insist that they do that is a little like insisting that they suspend the laws 
of physics.  It is easy to understand why firms would want to shift the cost of training new 
lawyers, but why they think they should be able to do it is baffling.  They seem to believe that it 
is possible to have a world in which there are only benefits and no burdens, only income and no 
expenses, but this vision of law firm nirvana does not exist.  Firms will have to bear some of the 
cost of new lawyer training whether they want to or not. 
 
Proponents of “practice ready” education want to change the nature of law school 
radically, not just add a few skills courses to the curriculum.  Skills courses have been around for 
decades they argue, and yet most law school graduates still are not “practice ready.”  In their 
view, law schools need to reverse the traditional instructional hierarchy, to make skills 
instruction the central theme and “thinking like a lawyer” the subplot.  The problem with this 
argument is that it is based on a kind of worker-bee myopia that fails to understand education’s 
principal contribution to development: to provide students with the knowledge and critical 
thinking skills needed to adapt received wisdom to changing circumstances, beliefs, and needs 
over time.  For legal education that means help law students devise more effective ways to 
structure law and legal institutions and live worthwhile professional lives.  Reducing legal 
education to motor skill training is just another example of the destructive short-term thinking 
that pervade the present day worlds of law and business. 
 
III.   “THINKING LIKE A LAWYER” IS THE ULTIMATE PRACTICE SKILL 
 
There is a more substantial objection to the argument for “practice ready” graduates, 
however, than the fact that law schools cannot produce them.  Increasing the time spent training 
students in practice skills will divert attention and resources from what law schools do best: 
teach the critical thinking skills that underlie and give shape to lawyer practice behavior 
generally.  Helping students learn to “think like a lawyer,” as the expression goes,61 is the most 
important contribution law schools can make to professional development.  “Thinking like a 
lawyer” is the ultimate practice skill and for law schools to reduce the attention given to 
developing it would be a self-inflicted wound of immense proportions.62                                                                                                                                                                                   
sense of the “client identification and loyalty” kind, and that “sense” can be learned only by working for actual 
clients. 
61 The term usually is defined to include analytical and analogical reasoning, theory building, the interpretation of 
texts, instrumental and strategic reasoning, and persuasive argument.  See Fried, supra note 31; Sunstein, supra note 
31.  Dean Arthurs has pointed out the essential connection between these reasoning skills and substantive 
knowledge.  See Harry Arthurs, The Future of Legal Education: Three Visions and a Prediction 6 (Osgoode CLPE 
Res. Paper No. 49/2013, Sept. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349633 
(describing law schools as “knowledge communities” that “exist to collect, critique, produce and disseminate 
knowledge.”).  Ironically, critical thinking skills, in one or another variation, are usually listed as among the 
important lawyer competencies used to support the case for “practice ready” graduates.  See Hamilton, supra note 
14, at 5, 6, 12, & 21 (describing survey results in which “analytical skills,” “analysis and reasoning,” and “ability in 
legal analysis and legal reasoning” are listed as among the most important lawyer competencies). 
62 See Barton, supra note 1, at 39 (“[C]orporate clients are seeking . . . not their time, but their insights” from 
lawyers.).  See also Michelle M. Harner, The Value of ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer,’ 70 MD. L. REV. 390 (2011) 
(describing thinking like a lawyer as the “hallmark” of being a lawyer). 
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Both in presenting their own work and evaluating the work of others, lawyers use a set of 
skills they refined (and sometimes learned for the first time) in law school: reasoning 
analogically, analyzing facts, synthesizing principles, devising ends-means strategies, 
interpreting texts, marshaling reasons and evidence to support arguments, and the like.63  These 
skills underlie and direct even the most mundane law practice tasks, from scanning a deposition 
transcript for issues to argue; reviewing a contract for errors and omissions; eliciting witness 
testimony to support a theory of the case; interviewing a client to determine if he has a claim; 
choosing a strategy for gaining leverage in negotiation;64 or making an argument to an adversary, 
mediator, bureaucrat, colleague, client, witness, judge, or clerk.  Each of these tasks begins with 
and is grounded in an understanding of the background normative standards and practical 
constraints that govern the issues under consideration and define the parties’ options.  Without 
this understanding a lawyer’s behavior would be only coincidentally effective.65 
 
Take the client interview as a case in point.  A client might tell a jumbled, partial, or 
confusing story about something that happened to him and ask if he had any legal rights in the 
matter.  A lawyer would need to ask about the relevant factual details the client did not provide 
on his own, organize and evaluate the story to determine if a legal remedy was available, predict 
the chances of a successful recovery, and calculate the cost of obtaining it, all before being able 
to say anything helpful to the client about what he might do.  The lawyer could try to learn this 
information and do this analysis using a standard set of questions and rules of thumb put together 
somewhat serendipitously from practice manuals, past experiences, other lawyers’ tips, and the 
like, but this would treat the client’s story as generic, miss its idiosyncratic features, and 
guarantee only that the lawyer could complete the interview, not conduct it skillfully.  
Questioning in a boilerplate manner like this often amounts to little more than practicing 
mistakes (one’s own and others’), under the guise of following received wisdom. 
 
To be truly effective, the lawyer’s inquiries and analysis would need to be adapted to the 
circumstances of the case, and to make those adaptations he would need to understand the legal 
and practical norms that govern the situation and the wide variety of ways in which they could be 
interpreted and used.  There is a direct connection in interview questioning, in other words, 
between ideas in the head and questions out of the mouth.  Questions are the end product of an 
analytical process that is no less important because it operates below the surface and is taken for 
granted.  The ability to ask questions in a confident and engaging manner is a far less useful skill 
than the ability to think of what questions to ask in the first instance.66  If one had to choose 
between form and substance (though the choice is rarely quite that stark), an awkwardly asked                                                         
63 Law schools are able to teach these skills at sophisticated levels because the conditions needed for high-level 
thinking are present in schools to the same extent that they are present in practice. 
64 Reconciling interests, if you are a communitarian.  See Robert J. Condlin, Every Day and in Every Way We Are 
All Becoming Meta and Meta, or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining 
Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 236-44 (2008) (describing communitarian bargaining). 
65 Law school graduates often take their critical reasoning skills for granted, believing that they had them when they 
entered law school.  It is one of the many ironies of the present day critique of legal education that critics use skills 
learned in law school to criticize law schools for failing to teach them skills. 
66 But see Dilloff, supra note 14, at 434 (“Law schools . . . must . . . teach . . . their students . . . how to say 
something in addition to what to say.”). 
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question that is on point is preferable to a stylishly asked question that is irrelevant.  The former 
may have only a small chance of being helpful, but the latter has none.  Only lawyers who can 
think like lawyers can ask questions like lawyers. 
 
Legal negotiation provides another example.  At its core, negotiation is an advocacy 
process.  Judgments about acceptable outcome inevitably are based on comparisons of proposals 
on the table with available alternatives.67  The best negotiators use normative standards to make 
these comparisons, so that their agreements are not the product of routine, arbitrariness, power, 
or fortuity.68  Lawyers usually disagree about normative standards, however, both their meaning 
and application, and to resolve these disagreements they discuss their competing views until they 
reach some sort of mutually acceptable understanding (even if it is only to agree to disagree).  A 
negotiator who is able to persuade the other side to see things his way in these discussions, 
everything else equal, does better than a negotiator who is not. 
 
Negotiation usually is personal and conducted in private, and these qualities make the 
stylized properties of public advocacy both rude and ineffective.  The best negotiators discuss 
their differences in a conversational manner,69 expanding one another’s understanding of the 
problem rather than dismissing their different views out of hand.  They try to inform and instruct 
more than impress and compete, and to create doubt in pre-negotiation assessments more than 
capitulation to a superior view.  In a real sense, they act as both colleagues and adversaries, 
searching for outcomes in their mutual interest while trying to bend those outcomes to their 
individual advantage.  While conversational, therefore, negotiation also is substantive.70  A 
skillful negotiator does not try to turn a weak claim into a strong one by using socio-
psychological tricks, clever word play, or rhetorical force.  Instead, he invents more and better 
arguments, and supports them with more and better reasons, than his counterpart on the other 
side.  He convinces his adversary, not that he is the better negotiator, but that he has the stronger 
case.71  Advocacy of this sort depends upon the ability to spot issues, generate arguments, and 
analyze problems from a greater number of perspectives than an adversary.  A negotiator who 
does this will be deferred to when it comes time to settle, and a negotiator who is deferred to will 
get better results.  When personal qualities and practical factors are held equal, effective 
negotiation has almost a one-for-one relationship with skillful legal analysis and argument.72  
One needs to think like a lawyer, in other words, to negotiate like a lawyer.                                                         
67 Professors Fisher and Ury famously labeled the alternative to a negotiated agreement as a BATNA, a “best 
alternative to negotiated agreement.”  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 101-11 (1981).  I focus on dispute negotiation in the example given, but advocacy plays an 
important role in transactional negotiation as well.  See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative 
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1992) (describing the differences between 
dispute settlement and transactional negotiation).  In commercial transactions the terms of a deal usually depend 
upon what is regarded as the “market” for that particular type of deal at that particular time, but what is “market” 
changes frequently and it’s present meaning is always subject to debate. 
68 See Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 303-06 (describing the different bases on which disputes 
may be resolved informally). 
69 See id. at 310-26 (describing conversational advocacy). 
70 See id. at 313-16 (describing the substantive properties of conversational argument). 
71 See id. at 324. 
72 It is widely believed that negotiation is mostly bluff and bluster and that the discussion of substantive concerns 
plays a small and not very important part.  This can be true, and will be if one does not insist on more, but when  
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Practice readiness also requires an understanding of lawyer role as much as a command 
of lawyer practice skill.  For most students, law school will be the last good opportunity to 
consider in detail, relatively unconstrained by financial, familial or psychological factors, how 
best to live their lives as lawyers: what ends to serve, what interests to defend and advance, and 
what principles to stand for.  Law schools have an obligation to help students think through these 
questions, identifying the various paths available in legal work and constructing standards for 
choosing among them.  As part of this obligation, they need to encourage students to ask 
themselves, albeit provisionally, where they fit in professional life (or if they fit at all), and to 
what types of settings they are best suited.73  Practice itself does not provide many opportunities 
or incentives for considering these questions, or much help in answering them. 
 
Not all students will be interested in issues of professional role, of course; many will be 
pre-occupied with technique.  That is the novice’s curse.  But that is not an argument against 
organizing legal instruction around them.  Issues of role pervade law practice and someone 
interested in a satisfying career as a lawyer must come to grips with them or risk being 
rudderless in professional life.74  From a law school’s perspective, students who confront such 
issues will be better adjusted and more thoughtful lawyers than students who do not, and adding 
even a small number of better adjusted and more thoughtful lawyers to the profession is better 
than adding a legion of unthinking automatons with virtuoso motor skills.75  Even students who 
believe they know how they want to live their professional lives will benefit from testing their 
views.  If the views are well founded, testing will confirm them, and if they are not, testing will 
be a lifesaver.  Providing a forum for the critical examination of how to live one’s life as a 
lawyer is one of the most important contributions law schools can make to the development of 
students.  To shortchange the examination of that issue in order to prepare students to navigate 
the currents, shoals, and reefs of law office politics would be perverse. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
bluff and bluster confront reasons and evidence, each advanced with equal force, reasons and evidence win.  To 
think otherwise is to believe that substantive law is irrelevant to legal disputes when substantive law defines legal 
disputes.  I discuss this topic at length in Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 298-309. 
73 Neil Dilloff recommends using practitioners to help examine these questions.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 453 
(“There is nothing like spending ten minutes with a senior practitioner, government official, in-house counsel, or law 
firm partner to get a truer picture of what practicing law means in different roles.”).  He has a somewhat exaggerated 
view of the teaching potential of ten minutes, even for “senior practitioners,” but his claim is true if read literally and 
the phrase “nothing like” is emphasized. 
74 See David L. Chambers, Satisfaction in the Practice of Law: Findings from a Long Term Study of Attorneys’ 
Careers 2 (Univ. Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 330, May 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274162 (survey of Michigan Law graduates found that “overall 
work satisfaction [was] much more closely related to perceptions of the social value of their work and the quality of 
their relations with co-workers than it [was] to their satisfaction with income or their prestige in the community.”).  
See also DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE 99 (2009) (describing the importance of autonomy to career satisfaction and the 
law firm billable hour as “perhaps the most autonomy-crushing mechanism imaginable.”); Steven J. Harper, A 
Dangerous, Million-Dollar Law School Distraction, AM. LAW. DAILY (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202612503156&A_Dangerous_MillionDollar_Law_Scho
ol_Distraction&slreturn=20130626132953 (“Anyone desiring to become an attorney shouldn’t do it for the 
money.”). 
75 See Konefsky & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 2 (“The real task of legal education must be to prepare students, as 
best we can, for a lifetime of successful, ethical, and personally rewarding practice.”). 
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IV.   WHY SKILLS INSTRUCTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A HARD SELL IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
 
The campaign to expand the place of skills instruction in the law school curriculum has 
met with mixed success over the years and this makes it somewhat of an anomaly in law school 
curricular reform.  Other reform projects, and there have been many, have received clear up or 
down votes, becoming full citizens of the law school or disappearing altogether (some doing 
both).  Each has had its probationary period when acceptance hung in the balance, but unlike 
skills instruction, each eventually has been taken in or kicked out.  Yet, after all these years, 
skills instruction remains in a kind of curricular limbo, its status still the subject of intense 
debate.  How can this be explained?76 
 
 Part of the answer, no doubt, lies in the nature of skills instruction itself.  To some extent 
it is an alien element in the world of legal education.  Historically, legal education has been 
about the study of law, its content, nature, and effects, the interests it serves, and the extent to 
which it embodies and effectuates the normative commitments of the society.  The goal in such 
study is intellectual understanding, and the skills most directly implicated are analysis and 
research.  Skills instruction, on the other hand, is about what law delivers more than what it 
promises and legal education always has been concerned more with promise than delivery. 
 
One way to understand the legal academy’s reluctance to embrace skills instruction is to 
identify the common properties of successful curricular reform efforts in the past, to see if they 
define a tacit standard of acceptance, and then hold skills instruction up to that standard.  The 
first step in doing this, constructing a consensus list of successful reforms, is itself controversial.  
Many legal academics still see doctrinal analysis and statutory interpretation as the only true 
subjects of law study, and dismiss everything else as marginal, faddish, or irrelevant.  Others see 
only their own particular policy or modeling projects as fully assimilated and everything else as 
temporary or shallow.  Sometimes it is difficult even to determine what counts as a reform: does 
it include a marginal extension of, or improvement on, an original theory, for example, or must it 
offer a wholly distinctive view?  However one answers these questions, there have been several 
undeniable reforms of the American law school curriculum over the years (albeit sometimes 
temporary), and most of them have been produced either by a “law and . . .” movement of some 
sort, or a critical jurisprudential school of thought.  My own list would include the programs in                                                         
76 The history of clinical legal education does not offer much help with this question.  After much huffing and 
puffing in the 1960s and 1970s, clinical and traditional law faculty members reached a kind of educational cease-
fire, agreeing to co-exist but not necessarily to think kindly of one another.  The cease-fire was not memorialized in 
any formal document and it was not reached at the same time in all law schools.  Instead, it just sort of happened, 
serendipitously and irregularly as law faculty members, clinical and traditional alike, started to live with one another 
side by side (or more accurately, floor by floor, or building by building), if not harmoniously, at least in mutual 
toleration.  While not ideal, this seemed to work but, sadly, it was not destined to last.  Perhaps peace was just too 
lifeless, too unprincipled, or too low-tech for some, but whatever the reason, the pot was stirred again by the 
MacCrate and Carnegie Reports (and now, the Task Force on Legal Education), and the game was back on.  See 
MACCRATE, supra note 30; EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (William M. 
Sullivan et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE].  Throughout all of this ferment “thinking like a lawyer” has 
remained first among equals in the spectrum of legal educational goals, but the millennialist revival of this never-
ending story has placed that status in jeopardy once again.  Somewhere, the ghosts of Marx and Santayana must be 
chuckling. 
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law and policy sciences, 77 law and social sciences,78 law and philosophy,79 law and economics,80 
and law and health sciences,81 as well as the critical jurisprudential schools of legal realism,82 
legal process,83 critical legal studies,84 feminist legal theory,85 critical race theory,86 and LGBT                                                         
77 See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training 
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal 
Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947).  See also STEVENS, supra note 4, at 
265-70 (describing “Law, Science, and Policy” approach to law study).  The first successful curricular reform of 
legal education was the case method itself, but I will treat that as the slate on which successive reform projects have 
written.  See STEVENS, supra note 4, at 36, 38, 52-56, 60-63, 122-23 (describing the introduction of the case method 
in American law schools). 
78 This category includes courses of instruction associated with the Law & Society movement, see Lawrence M. 
Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social 
Science Research in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 465 (1988), as well as those of earlier 
Sociological Jurisprudence.  See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. 
REV. 489 (1912).  It also includes courses of instruction in Law and Psychology/Psychiatry.  See, e.g., Stone, supra 
note 44; Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 
U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1968). 
79 See STEVENS, supra note 4, at 274-75; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal 
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627 (1993); Symposium, Contemporary Legal Theory, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 
(1986); William Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart, 95 L. Q. REV. 
557 (1979). 
80 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 
1992); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); 
James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161 (1986). 
81 LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Oliver R. Goodenough & Michael Freeman eds., 2009); LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN ET AL., 
LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM (2014); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES (A. Battro, S. Dehaene & W. 
Singer eds., 2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012); Frank Pasquale, Grand 
Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682 (2013); Frank Pasquale, 
Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 269 (2010); Amanda C. Pustilnik, 
Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009). 
82 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY chs. 5 & 6 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (2d ed. 
1973); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 
(1979). 
83 See KALMAN, supra note 82, at 222-24; STEVENS, supra note 4, at 270-71.  For the bible of the legal process 
movement, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958).  See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law 
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-23 (1991) (discussing the 
“new” legal process scholarship using the work of John Hart Ely as an example). 
84 See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); STEVENS, supra note 4, at 275; 
Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 765 (1982); James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. 
L. REV. 685 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1989); Robert W. Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal 
Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its 
Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). 
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theory. 87  Many other projects, schools, programs, and movements of varying sizes and scope no 
doubt could be included in this list.88                                                                                                                                                                                   
85 See, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN  LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy 
eds., 1991); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 
(1989); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); Isabel Marcus et 
al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); Symposium, 
Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 
26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 423-28 (1994). 
86 See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some 
Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); 
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 
1 (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 39; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil 
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); 
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1077 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 
(1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial 
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal 
Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. 
L. REV. 219; Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1844 (1990). 
87 See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2002); Kenji Yoshino, 
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). 
88 They could include: legal formalism, see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 137, 154-57 (1994) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)); M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to 
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); analytic 
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Edgar Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of Its Usefulness, 104 
U. PA. L. REV. 1080 (1956); H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958); rights jurisprudence, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); law and literature, see, e.g., Symposium, Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 
(1982); Symposium, Law and Literature: “No Manifesto,” 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); Robin L. West, 
Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 
203 (1987); law and interpretation, see, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 
(1982); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 
(1989); civic republicanism, see, e.g., Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); 
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); legal pragmatism, 
see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); John Stick, Can 
Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 383-85 (1986); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in 
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); law and religion, see, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD 
AND THE LAW (1993); HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS 
DEVOTION (1993); THOMAS L. SCHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981); 
and law and globalization, see Carole Silver, Getting Real About Globalization and Legal Education: Potential and 
Perspectives for the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 457 (2013).  See also John O. Mudd, Academic Change in Law 
Schools, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 30 n.3 (1993-94) (summarizing the literature describing curricular change 
movements in American law schools). 
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“Law and . . .” programs are supplementary in nature, cross-pollinating the legal subject 
matter with theories and methods from other mature disciplines.89  They expand theoretical 
perspectives and methodological tools to permit a more comprehensive examination of the nature 
and function of law, the effectiveness of legal institutions, and the legitimacy of legal results.  
Critical jurisprudence, on the other hand, does not supplement legal study so much as seek to 
transform it.  It argues, in one form or another, that conventional theory distorts and effaces the 
interests of marginalized groups, is internally contradictory, is based on false and ideologically 
motivated assumptions of social fact, is intellectually incoherent, and overstates its own 
impartiality.90  In a sense, it challenges law to have the courage of its convictions.91 
 
While ostensibly different, therefore, one an outsider project interested in broadening law 
study and the other an insider project interested in transforming it, “law and . . .” programs and 
critical jurisprudential theories have important properties in common.  Both are normative 
projects, for example, concerned with issues of law, politics,92 and morality more than issues of 
skills, training, and technique, and focused on reforming rules, policies, and procedures more 
than refining practice conventions and consensus strategies.  Change legal rules, these projects 
seem to assume, and justice will be done; expand theoretical perspectives and understanding will 
increase.  Except for some forms of feminist jurisprudence, neither project is a “thousand points 
of light” or “eternal vigilance” type of reform in which collective change is seen as the sum of 
individual changes in the lives of discrete actors.  Each seems suspicious of reforms that require 
the coordination of thousands of individuals over time, in fact, where one cannot be sure 
everyone will do his part, or even that the parts will be understood consistently from one person 
to the next.  If the satisfaction in legal thinking comes from knowing that future generations will 
march to the “measure of [one’s] thought,”93 it is not surprising that the properties of law school 
curricular reform would be similarly grandiose.                                                         
89 I think of a discipline as mature if it has a well-defined intellectual history, more than one major theoretical 
tradition, conflicting schools of thought within each tradition, shared analytical and empirical methods, and a core of 
basic knowledge that most in the discipline accept as true. 
90 The so-called nihilists state these claims in the strongest terms.  See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Joseph Singer, The 
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). 
91 Though this challenge often is expressed in the language of “fancy theory,” for the most part critical jurisprudence 
is not a theory-driven project.  Its proponents, trained mostly in law, argue the side of the analytical coin that says 
“not.”  They challenge popular beliefs using familiar legal ideas (e.g., justice, fairness, even-handedness, 
consistency, equality, and the like) and methods in a manner everyone in law school recognizes and accepts as 
legitimate.  They do not need to be assimilated because they start in the mainstream, and this explains their relatively 
quick and easy acceptance, notwithstanding the often unwelcome nature of what they have to say.  The Legal 
Realists and Critical Legal Studies “Crits” are the classic examples. 
92 I use “politics” here in its classical sense, as shorthand for the normative ideas and principles (e.g., justice, 
fairness, equality) that a society uses to interpret and govern social life.  I do not mean organizational politics. 
93 See THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 32-33 
(Max Lerner ed., Modern Library 1953) (1943) [hereinafter HOLMES]; 
Only when you have worked alone—when you have felt around you a black gulf 
of solitude more isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope 
and in despair have trusted to your own unshaken will—then only will you have  
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If past curricular reform efforts have been concerned principally with issues of law, 
politics, and morality, therefore, and have been based on ideas borrowed from other mature 
disciplines or critical jurisprudential schools of thought, skills instruction has a different focus 
and a different pedigree.  It is about lawyer behavior more than law (and individual lawyer 
behavior more than lawyer behavior in the aggregate), and strategic maneuvering more than 
politics and morality.94  For the most part, it accepts the moral and political beliefs of the 
existing legal world as givens and focuses on teaching students to achieve instrumental success 
within that world.  Its analytical categories are technical more than political, and its perspective 
is personal more than systemic.  It is a field without its own distinctive Freud-Marx-Jesus 
debates (and more importantly, without its own Freud, Marx and Jesus), which is to say that it is 
a field that is not yet completely conceptualized, connected, and grounded.95 
 
The study of skills need not be relentlessly instrumental.  Jurisprudentially, it could be 
based on a kind of Holmesian “bad man” (or Legal Realist “functionalist”) view, for example, 
one that looks at law and legal institutions from the perspective of how they will be manipulated 
by self-interested actors, and concerned with making suggestions, both to individuals and 
institutions, for neutralizing (or at least minimizing the harmful effects of) that manipulation.96  
Early in its history, skills instruction looked as if it might develop in a jurisprudential direction, 
but for the most part that did not happen.97  Instead, many of its practitioners went down the path                                                                                                                                                                                   
achieved.  Thus only can you gain the secret isolated joy of the thinker, who 
knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men who never heard 
of him will be moving to the measure of his thought—the subtle rapture of a 
postponed power, which the world knows not because it has no external 
trappings, but which to his prophetic vision is more real than that which 
commands an army . . . it is only thus that you can know that you have done 
what it lay in you to do—can say that you have lived, and be ready for the end. 
Id. 
94 I do not suggest that practice skills are unrelated to politics and morality, just that the connections among the three 
are not self-evident and often are not made explicit in the literature on skills instruction. 
95 Accord Joseph P. Tomain & Michael E. Solimine, Skills Skepticism in the Postclinic World, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
307, 316 (1990) (“[U]ntil we connect skills programs to a sound, coherent, normatively grounded theory of 
lawyering—skills training will remain an empty technical exercise.”).  In a sense, skills instruction has the potential 
to re-work legal education radically, substituting a functionalist approach to law for a conceptualist one.  In this, it 
shares the agenda of Legal Realism, at least Realism as envisioned in the 1920s and 30s, if not the one 
institutionalized in the 1950s.  See KALMAN, supra note 82, at 230-31.  But just as the potential of Realism was 
squelched by the Realists, see id., so too the potential of skills instruction is in danger of being squelched by skills 
teachers.  This happens all too often when curricular reform efforts become mainstream and produce what 
sociologists used to call the “institutionalization of means”, and the “formalization of routine.”  See J.B. LON 
HEFFERLIN, DYNAMICS OF ACADEMIC REFORM 11 (1969). 
96 See HOLMES, supra note 93, at 74; 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables 
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
Id. 
97 For discussions in the early clinical literature of the relationship of skills to justice, see, e.g., William H. Simon, 
Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980); Marie Ashe, The “Bad 
Mother” in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992); Nancy Cook, Legal  
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of technique (“best practices,” in the now-fashionable terminology),98 inventing and cataloguing 
socio-psychological moves and maneuvers (adapted from ego psychology, game theory, 
behavioral economics, and the like) for instrumental use in interactions with clients, adversaries, 
and others.  When this happened, issues of politics and morality were minimized, placed on hold, 
or dropped out of the picture altogether, and at that point skills instruction began to look like a 
foreign element to many in the legal academy.99 
 
The most prominent of the skills instruction reforms, the clinical education movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, was based on a substantive critique of legal education that succeeded in 
major part because it was made at a time (not unlike the present) when the legal world was in 
turmoil and law schools were undergoing a crisis of confidence.100  Law faculties varyingly were                                                                                                                                                                                   
Fictions: Clinical Experiences, Lace Collars and Boundless Stories, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 41 (1994); Theresa 
Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 
(1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 1599 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the 
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).  Much of this writing takes the form of richly annotated 
ethnographies of law practice, discussing skill in the context of what it means to succeed as a lawyer while treating 
others humanely, pursuing justice before material or reputational success, and living full emotional, social, and 
intellectual lives. 
98 See CARNEGIE, supra note 76; ROY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). 
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Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid 
Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for 
Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973).  They taught about poverty and its effects, 
institutional ineptitude and unresponsiveness, distributional inequities, prejudice and its consequences, and the 
possibilities and limits of an ends-based morality authorizing system manipulation to produce good outcomes in 
individual cases.  See Gary S. Laser, Educating for Professional Competence in the Twenty-First Century: 
Educational Reform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 243, 275 (1992) (“Most of the early 
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clinics want[ed] to de-emphasize the political agenda of their programs to make them more palatable to various 
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convinced, intimidated, or shamed into increasing their skills offerings but not to the point where 
such instruction became the central focus of law study.  Some still regret the decision to do this 
and they comprise a large segment of those opposed to the “practice ready” reform.101  Others, 
particularly those who participated in clinical courses in law school, are willing to give skills 
instruction more time to develop, but they too often are reluctant to make it the focal point of law 
study.  Proponents of skills instruction have yet to convince the professoriate that the study of 
practice skill is a natural extension of the intellectual and substantive activity going on in the rest 
of law school, the application of “thinking like a lawyer” skills to the practical realm.  That this 
would remain a live concern more than fifty years after the clinical revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s reflects the difficulty of the issues.102 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
The debate over the place of “practice ready” skills instruction in American legal education is 
a little like the Thirty Years War.103  The causes of the War went back decades to unresolved 
grievances, unfulfilled promises, unfair treaties, unmade marriages and unrealized images of 
one’s place in the world, so that while ostensibly about religion, the War also was about the 
division of wealth, territory, status, and power.  It flared up and died down on a regular basis for 
at least thirty, and as many as one hundred, years depending upon where one lived, and more 
than once when it appeared to be over a new country was heard from (usually at the prodding of 
some evil genius), in the form of an invasion or an alliance, and the fighting started all over 
again.  Like two-party resolutions to multi-party bargaining problems, peace treaties routinely 
were destabilized by those treated badly by the settlement terms, those who would benefit from 
the devastation more fighting would bring, and those who simply liked to fight.  Only an epoch-
making shift in geopolitical thinking, from the universalist morality of medieval Christianity’s 
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“one god in heaven and one ruler on earth,” to the modern Realpolitik based view of raison 
d’état and balance of power, freed the belligerents to design and implement a lasting peace.104 
 
The law school skills instruction debate also goes back decades to unresolved disagreements, 
unrequited overtures, and unforgiven slights, sometimes reducing to a trickle, only to become 
resurgent at the urging of a powerful interest group or strong personality; and it too seems 
destined never to end.105  While ostensibly about the content and structure of American legal 
education, it also is about the allocation of power, status, and authority in the legal profession, 
the important practical question of who will pay for what, and the seemingly intractable problem 
of how to connect theory to practice.106  Whether the debate will end like the War, with a 
reconciliatory intellectual breakthrough, remains to be seen, though there are reasons to be 
doubtful, and the argument for practice ready graduates shows why.  Where the discussion of 
morality and politics is called for, it focuses on motor skills and costs.  Where theory is needed, 
it offers taxonomy.  Where depth is required, it glides cheerfully over the surface.  And where 
multiple points of view are needed, it narrows discussion to a single idea.107  It has all the 
qualities of a lost cause having a Warholian moment.  Hopefully, the good sense that prevailed in 
the last century has some life left in it yet. 
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